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SEARCHING FOR REMEDIAL PARADIGMS:
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF
TERRORISM
FRANCES HOWELL RUDKO
By recognizing the overriding importance of
civil liberties even in wartime, the Supreme
Court has . . . [perhaps] learned the lessons of
our own history -- that especially in wartime,
the nation depends on independent federal
courts to guard the liberties of all and to be
skeptical of claims of military necessity.1
It is neither desirable nor is it remotely likely
that civil liberty will occupy as favored a
position in wartime as it does in peacetime.
But it is both desirable and likely that more
careful attention will be paid by the courts to
the basis for the government‘s claims of
necessity as a basis for curtailing civil liberty.2
Nine years after the unprecedented terrorist attacks on
September 11, judicial response to various governmental and
individual methods of combating terrorism remains
deferential and restrained. The courts have heard at least
three types of cases brought by advocates for three distinct
groups: the alleged perpetrators of terrorism; the victims of
terrorist attacks; and third party humanitarian groups. Implicit
in the practical question of how to deal effectively with


Professor of Law, University of Massachusetts School of Law at
Dartmouth.
1
GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME:
FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM, 556 note
(W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. 2004) (quoting Fred Korematsu‘s
response to the Guantanamo Bay and Hamdi decisions).
2
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN WARTIME, 224-25 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1998).

116

2010

Human Rights in the Age of Terrorism

117

terrorism is the broader consideration which Congress, the
President and others must also address: how to respond to the
terrorists‘ extreme human rights violations without violating
international human rights norms and international
humanitarian law.
In the courts, most attention has focused on the cases
brought to vindicate the rights of detainees as alleged
perpetrators of terrorism. Government military policies
responding to terrorism include prolonged detention of
―enemy combatants‖ with restricted habeas corpus access and
a trial process in military commissions. Historically, during
times of crisis, the federal government uses various control
mechanisms (however ill conceived) to suppress activities
deemed threatening to national security. A brief survey of
recent cases in Part I will demonstrate that the Supreme Court
has ruled haltingly but decisively to assure that the detainees
receive due process rights afforded by the Constitution while,
at the same time, protecting the government‘s national
security interests.
A second group of cases are those brought to compensate
victims of terrorism. These cases stem from earlier acts of
terrorism, the Iran Hostage Event, the SS Cole Attack, but
also include suits by victims of the 2001 attack. Congress
and the Executive have provided methods of compensating
the victims and increased the terror victims‘ ability to file
civil suits against terrorist perpetrators. Seen as an effective
deterrent to terrorism by making those who fund terrorist
activities pay for their involvement, the cases are
intermittently welcomed by the government. A discussion of
the current commentary endorsing this approach illustrates
that this remedial paradigm is gaining in importance.
Statutes restricting communication and material support
to government-designated foreign terrorist organizations have
spawned a third group of cases, brought by third parties to
protect free speech and association rights of individuals and
organizations adversely affected by the laws. In the 20092010 term, for the first time, the Supreme Court heard one of
these cases, Humanitarian Law Project, et al. v. Eric H.
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Holder, Jr.3 (hereinafter ―HLP, et al‖). The decision ended
a twelve year litigation pursued by two citizens and six
organizations who challenged the material-support provisions
of the Patriot Act, initially passed within days of the 9/11
terrorist attack. A close review of the opinions in HLP, et al
exemplifies again the cautious and deferential role espoused
by the judiciary.
In each line of cases, the plaintiffs argue for a different
remedial solution to the evils of terrorism. Terrorist acts,
which either target or incidentally kill innocent civilians, are
a profound violation of human rights law, recognized on both
the municipal and international level, a fact also recognized
by the plaintiffs in all of the cases, even though terrorist
methods are often justified as a means to principled ends.
Congress and the Executive enacted various measures in the
wake of September 11 to counteract threatened terrorists‘
attacks.
Retaliatory and preventative action was
comprehensive.4
When the United States government
responded to terrorism with policies which arguably violate
civil rights and human rights norms, civil liberties advocates
argued that these policies must be changed to afford
constitutional due process protections. Victims of terrorist
activities and their advocates, by seeking damages from the
perpetrators, strike at the financial viability of terrorist
groups. Non-governmental groups, dedicated to enforcing
human rights, focus on defeating terrorism by informing and
educating the perpetrators in nonviolent methods of achieving
their principled goals. These groups seek unrestricted access
to communicate with the alleged terrorists and offer to the
terrorists solutions which do not violate human rights.

3

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. (2010); 130 S.Ct.
2705 (2010).
4
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Center on the Administration of
Criminal Law in Support of Eric Holder, Jr., Attorney General, et al. at 4,
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010) (Nos. 081498, 09-89), 2009 WL 5177141. ―Preventing terrorism requires
thwarting plots and starving terrorist organizations of the resources
necessary to fund their violent missions. All elements of national power,
including federal criminal law, contribute to this effort.‖
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I. PROLONGED DETENTION AND THE WRIT
In the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, the
Supreme Court decided four major cases5 within a period of
four years involving the rights of captured detainees, ―enemy
combatants,‖ being held indefinitely without being given the
constitutional due process rights regularly afforded the
criminally accused under the Constitution. Immediately after
September 11, the President and Congress implemented a
national defense strategy to punish the alleged terrorists and
to prevent future terrorist attacks. Exercising shared war
powers given to them by the Constitution, the two branches
of government worked in tandem to secure the nation. Most
notable for purposes of judicial review were the military
commissions set up to try the detainees.
Within a few days of the September 11 attack, Congress
passed the Joint Resolution for the Authorization for Use of
Military Force (hereinafter ―AUMF‖)6 empowering the
President to use ―all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks .
. .‖7 On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued an
executive order8 setting up military tribunals to try nonUnited States citizens accused of terrorism. The President
specifically noted that for the ―safety of the United States and
the nature of international terrorism . . . it is not practicable to
apply in military commissions under this order the principles
of law and rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial
of criminal cases in the United States district courts.‖9 The
order further provided that the terms of detention would be
5

The first of the cases, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) was
followed the same year by Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) was heard two years later and
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) was heard two years after
Hamdan.
6
AUMF, S.J.Res. 23, 107th Congr. See 115 Stat. 224 § 2(a) (2001).
The resolution was issued pursuant to the War Powers Resolution of
1973.
7
Id.
8
Exec. Order, No. 57833, 66 C.F.R. 57833 (2001).
9
Id.
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prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.10 These two events
effectively set in motion the debate over civil liberties that
would dominate the next decade and bring to the Supreme
Court the prolonged detention cases beginning with Rasul v.
Bush (2004) and culminating in Boumediene v. Bush
(2008).11
As early as March of 2002, Professor Ruth Wedgewood12
of Yale University School of Law, speaking at the University
of Illinois in Champaign, Illinois, in defense of the military
commissions, was met by protestors organized by University
of Illinois law professor Francis Boyle who described the
courts as ―un-American‖ ―kangaroo courts.‖13 The debate
was quickly taken to the federal courts in cases brought by
the detainees seeking to contest detention under the
Suspension Clause of the Constitution.
A brief look at the detainee cases will reveal that the
Supreme Court was divided in the decisions, showed
deference to the two branches of government given war
powers by the Constitution, and, accordingly, made case by
case decisions conscious of a framework of shared
government powers. The Supreme Court decided the first
detainee case, Rasul v. Bush,14 in 2004. The petitioner was
an alien captured in Afghanistan being held at Guantanamo
Bay Naval Base in Cuba. The majority opinion by Justice
Stevens found that habeas corpus relief would extend
extraterritorially to the prisoners held at the United States
military base, that the habeas statute confers a right to judicial
review of the legality of executive detention of aliens in ―a
territory over which the United States exercises plenary and

10

Id. at 57834.
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723 (2008).
12
Professor Wedgewood ―helped draft proposals‖ for the military
tribunal and emphasized in response to probing questions that ―the United
States court system [could] not adapt to the terrorist situation.‖ Alina
Dizik, U. Ill. Speaker Defends Military Tribunals, U-Wire, 2002 WL
16985298, Mar. 29, 2002.
13
Id.
14
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
11
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exclusive jurisdiction, but not ‗ultimate sovereignty.‘‖15
Writing for Justices Roberts and Thomas, Justice Scalia
would not extend the protection of the writ to aliens held
―outside the sovereign borders of the United States and
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of all its courts.‖16 Justice
Scalia decries the majority holding as a ―wrenching departure
from precedent.‖17 Insisting that by ―abandoning the
venerable statutory line drawn in Eisentrager, the court
boldly extends the scope of the habeas statute to the four
corners of the earth.‖18
In the same year the Court heard Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,19 a
case brought by a United States‘ citizen captured in
Afghanistan, being held as an ―enemy combatant‖ within the
United States. Yasar Esam Hamdi was born in Louisiana in
1980 but was living in Afghanistan in 2001 when he was
captured.20 The Court found that a ―citizen-detainee seeking
to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must
receive notice of the factual basis for his classification and a
fair opportunity to rebut the Government‘s factual assertions
before a neutral decisionmaker.‖21 O‘Connor, speaking for a
plurality that included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy and Breyer, thought the fact that habeas corpus had
not been suspended assured the citizen-detainee a ―fair
hearing‖ before some ―neutral decisionmaker,‖ but to others
on the Court, the citizen-detainee was entitled to release.22
15

Id. at 475.
Id. at 488.
17
Id. at 505.
18
Id. at 498.
19
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
20
Id. at 510.
21
Id. at 532.
22
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 541 Souter, J., and Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment reasoned that the
detention was unauthorized and that Hamdi should be released. Scalia, J.,
joined by Stevens, J., dissenting, reasoned that the law of war could not be
applied under the open court doctrine (id. citing Ex parte Milligan, 71
U.S. 2 (1866) and noted that the court should grant the writ to Hamdi,
after which time, ―the Executive may then hand him over to the criminal
authorities, whose detention for the purpose of prosecution will be lawful,
or else must release him.‖ (quoting Id. at 576) Scalia, J., dissenting, faults
16
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Justice Thomas, dissenting, thought the question of
Hamdi‘s lawful detention came to ―the Court with the
strongest presumptions in favor of the Government.‖23 He
concluded that ―the Government‘s detention of Hamdi as an
enemy combatant‖ was entitled to deference as the
―President, in the prosecution of a war and authorized by
Congress, has acted well within his authority[,]‖ and that
Hamdi ―received all the process to which he was due . . . .‖24
Although Justice O‘Connor boldly stated that ―a state of
war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to
the rights of the Nation‘s citizens,‖25 she also recognized the
sources that limited that power, ―unless Congress acts to
suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the
Judicial Branch to play a necessary role in maintaining this
delicate balance of governance, serving as an important
judicial check on the Executive‘s discretion in the realm of
detentions.‖26
The dialogue between the branches of
government is evidenced by the action taken by Congress and
the Executive in response to the two cases decided in 2004.
The Secretary of Defense, in July of 2004, created a review
process by which detainees could contest their enemycombatant status before a Combat Status Review Tribunal
(hereinafter ―CSRT‖) and Congress passed the Detainee
Treatment Act (hereinafter ―DTA‖) which restricted review
of CSRT‘s rulings to procedural regularity issues and
channeled appeals to the D.C. Circuit.27
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,28 the Supreme Court reaffirmed
that the detainees were entitled to habeas corpus relief. The
case was decided by a 5-3 majority, as Chief Justice Roberts,
having heard the case below, recused. Salim Ahmed
Hamdan, being held since 2002 at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
the majority for ―remediation of executive default,‖ insisting that the ―role
of habeas corpus is to determine the legality of executive detention, not to
supply the omitted process necessary to make it legal.‖ Id.
23
Id. at 594.
24
Id.
25
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536.
26
Id.
27
See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 572-73 (2006).
28
Hamden v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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was a Yemeni national captured abroad. He contested the
procedures provided by the military commission court. The
Supreme Court overturned the jurisdiction stripping
provisions of the DTA and found that the military
commissions procedures violated Article 36 of Uniform
Code of Military Justice (hereinafter ―UCMJ‖) which
requires that military commission procedures be equivalent to
the procedures followed in courts martial.29 Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, outlined the military commissions
procedures.30 He noted that the ―accused and his civilian
counsel may be excluded from and precluded from ever
hearing what evidence was presented . . . [if] either the
Appointing Authority or the presiding officer decide to
‗close‘‖; that ―any evidence‖ can be admitted that, ―in the
opinion of the presiding officer ‗would have probative value
to a reasonable person‘‖; and that ―neither live testimony nor
witnesses‘ written statements need be sworn.‖31The Court
also found that the procedures violated the requirements of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions32 which
Article 21 of the UCMJ recognizes as mandatory for military
commissions under the laws of war.33
Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito, however, dissented.
Each wrote a separate dissent with one common thread, the
need to defer to the other branches of government. The
dissenters would have granted the Government‘s request for
abstention, citing ―considerations of inter-branch comity at
the federal level [that] weigh heavily against our exercise of
equity jurisdiction in this case . . . [exercise of which] brings
the Judicial Branch into direct conflict with the Executive in
an area where the Executive‘s competence is maximal and
ours is virtually non-existent.‖34 Scalia would also have
upheld the jurisdiction stripping provisions of the DTA which
29

Id. at 617-20.
Id. at 613-15.
31
Id. at 614.
32
Id. at 625. See also id. at 625-36, for full discussion.
33
Id. at 628. The Geneva Conventions are part of the law of war, and
―compliance with the law of war is the condition upon which the authority
[for military commissions] set forth in Article 21 is granted.‖
34
Hamden v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 676-77 (2006).
30
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provided that ―[n]o court, justice or judge shall have
jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of
habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detainee by the
Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.‖35 He
reasoned that the provision did not violate the Suspension
Clause because ―. . . it is clear that Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is
outside the sovereign ‗territorial jurisdiction‘ of the United
States . . . [and that p]etitioner, an enemy alien detained
abroad, has no rights under the Suspension Clause.‖36 And
Justice Thomas, in a separate dissent, continued the theme by
arguing that ―the President‘s decision to try Hamdan before a
military commission . . . is entitled to a heavy measure of
deference.‖37
As if to invite more dialogue among the branches of
government, Justice Breyer noted in his short concurrence,
joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, that nothing
―prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek
the authority he believes necessary.‖ 38 And Justice Kennedy,
speaking for Justices Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg, was more
explicit, ―In light of the conclusion that the military
commissions at issue are unauthorized, Congress may choose
to provide further guidance in this area. Congress, not the
Court, is the branch in the better position to undertake the
‗sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent
with the national interest or with international justice.‘‖39
Post-Hamdan, Congress passed the Military Commissions
Act (hereinafter ―MCA‖)40 which would be tested in the next
case to come before the Court, Boumediene, et al v. Bush, et
al.41Multiple aliens, detained as enemy combatants, presented
the question, inter alia, of whether the detainees ―have the
constitutional privilege of habeas corpus‖42 as guaranteed by
the Suspension Clause. The Court, having resolved habeas
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Id. at 656. See also DTA, §1005 (e)(1), 119 Stat. 2742 (2005).
Id. at 670.
Id. at 680.
Id. at 636.
Id. at 655.
MCA, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
Id. at 732.
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questions in the previous cases by statutory analysis,
answered the Constitutional question in the affirmative.43 In
a 5-4 decision, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia wrote separate
dissents joined by each other and Justices Thomas and Alito.
The majority ruled that the DTA procedures were not an
adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus,44 and that
§ 7 of the MCA operated as an ―unconstitutional suspension
of the writ.‖45
Justice Kennedy specifically noted the ―ongoing dialogue
between and among the branches of Government‖ and
recognized that Congressional passage of the MCA was in
direct response to the Hamdan decision.46 Although holding
that the detainees could directly seek the writ of habeas
corpus in federal district courts without exhausting the
remedies in the DTA and the CRST process,47 he stressed
that, after the decision, the ―outer boundaries of war powers
[are left] undefined‖ and that the ―political branches . . . can
engage in a genuine debate about how best to preserve
constitutional values while protecting the Nation from
terrorism.‖48
As the majority did not invalidate the
procedures contained in the DTA and the MCA, except for §
7 of the MCA, it left intact the remedial paradigms in those
provisions49 and opened up federal jurisdiction with
procedures to be designed by the district courts. Noting that
the majority did not attempt ―to offer a comprehensive
summary of the requisites for an adequate substitute for
habeas corpus,‖50 Justice Kennedy did identify two attributes
of an acceptable habeas review; the privilege must entitle the
―prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he
43

Id. at 733.
Id. at 734.
45
Id. at 792. MCA § 7 ―denies the federal courts jurisdiction to hear
habeas corpus actions pending at the time of its enactment.‖ Id. at 736.
46
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 738 (2008).
47
Id. at 795.
48
Id. at 797-98.
49
Id. at 795.
50
Id. at 779.
44
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is being held pursuant to ‗the erroneous application or
interpretation‘ of relevant law‖ and ―the habeas court must
have the power to order the conditional release of an
individual unlawfully detained-though release need not be the
exclusive remedy and is not the appropriate one in every case
in which the writ is granted.‖51 The Court further noted that
more procedural protection might be required depending on
the circumstances.52
To the dissenters, the majority did not define an
alternative effective habeas review, leaving ―open the distinct
possibility that its ‗habeas‘ remedy will, when all is said and
done, end up looking a great deal like the DTA review it
rejects.‖53 Chief Justice Roberts, for the dissenters, defended
the process created by the Congressional acts, 54 insisting that
―the system that the political branches constructed adequately
protects any constitutional rights aliens captured abroad and
detained as enemy combatants may enjoy.‖55 Justice Scalia
wrote separately to point out the ―legal errors‖ in the Court‘s
opinion and to note, as before, that ―The writ of habeas
corpus does not, and never has, run in favor of aliens abroad .
. . the Court‘s intervention in this military matter is entirely
ultra vires.‖56
The Supreme Court, in the detainee cases, gave the alien
detainee at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba a
constitutional right to habeas corpus. The implementation of
that right for each detainee remains unresolved. The
decisions significantly reveal that the search for remedial
paradigms continues and is, in fact, an inter-branch search.
Professor Aziz Z. Huq of Chicago University Law
School, using admittedly limited empirical data,57 critically
51

Id.
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008).
53
Id. at 825.
54
Id. at 803-809.
55
Id. at 802-803.
56
Id. at 827.
57
For the years, 2002-2009, Huq studied the trends in detainee
population at Guantanamo Bay. See Aziz Z. Huq, What Good is Habeas,
Vol. 26 No. 3, Const. Comment, 385 Summer 2010, at 402. He
documented the yearly population of detainees including the transfers and
52
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analyzed the effect of the decisions.58 Using the two-fold
purpose of habeas review advanced by Justice Kennedy in
Boumediene, he attempted to define the impact the decisions
had on (1) the personal liberty of the detainees and (2) the
establishment of legal boundaries on executive detention
policy.59 He concluded that in relation to meaningful habeas
review, the ―net result of Boumediene . . . was to leave the
substantive law of executive detention incrementally murkier
than before.‖ In relation to the Executive‘s legal position, he
found that ―Boumediene did not prompt any substantial
change.‖60 The data supported Professor Huq‘s conclusion
that the Hamdi and Rasul decisions had the indirect effect of
―nudg[ing]
the
Executive
into
more
wholesale
reconsideration of detainee processing.‖61 This indirect effect
finding supports the inter-branch dialogue the Justices
encouraged in the opinions.
II. CIVIL DAMAGES FOR TORT VICTIMS
Debra M. Strauss, in a recent law review article,62
predicted that civil lawsuits brought by victims against
terrorists and their supporters, encouraged by the Justice for
Victims of Terrorism Act (hereinafter ―JVTA‖) passed in
January of 2008, would increase. She explained the rationale
for the second line of cases:
As the judgments from the civil lawsuits
build, the United States is well on its way to
releases, id. at 403; compared the population trends at Guantanamo Bay
with population trends at Bagram, id. at 404-405; and compared habeas
releases before and after the Boumediene decision.
58
Aziz Z. Huq, What Good is Habeas, Vol. 26, No. 3, Const.
Comment, 385 Summer 2010.
59
Id. at 385, 395.
60
Id. at 412.
61
Id. at 427.
62
Debra M. Strauss, Reaching Out to the International Community:
Civil Lawsuits as the Common Ground in the Battle Against Terrorism,
19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT‘L. L. 307 (2008-2009). Debra Strauss, a
graduate of Yale University School, is Assistant Professor of Business
Law, Fairfield University, Charles F. Dolan School of Business.
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combating terrorism through this novel and
different - nonmilitary approach, whereby
one can compensate the victims of terrorism
and at the same time potentially deplete the
assets and financial support for future
terrorist acts.63
Although ―progress to date is just the beginning,‖64
Professor Strauss envisioned a global financial war on
terrorism which includes enforcement of civil judgments by a
―three pronged approach:‖
First, the Security Council should increase its
enforcement of members‘ effort to freeze
assets overseas. . . . Second, the national
courts of member states should commit to the
enforcement of the civil judgments of U.S.
courts for the victims of terrorism, levying
upon the assets of organizations connected to
terrorism wherever they may be found. . . .
Finally, international courts should exercise
concurrent jurisdiction in these matters,
enabled by their potential access to the frozen
assets of terrorists organizations . . . [and]
should provide terrorism victims with access
to frozen assets obtained through UN
resolutions.65
Professor Strauss proposed a global effort with ―[s]trict
enforcement of [U.N.] resolutions accented by the seizure of
financial assets and the use of the international judicial
system [as] the most effective, logical and realistic
approach.‖66 She noted that the 1566 Working Group of the
Security Council ―already appears to be exploring an
international compensation fund for the victims‖ and
63
64
65
66

Id. at 310.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 352-53.
Id. at 354-55.
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suggested that the Group might ―provide an independent
avenue for victims of international terrorism to pursue civil
lawsuits against terrorist groups and state sponsors of
terrorism in international courts.‖67 Throughout the article,
Professor Strauss stresses that the international community
shares a strong commitment to fight terrorism and that there
is a demonstrated common goal to wage a civil battle. She
concluded that ―it is only through the active role of the UN
and other organizations, including the courts worldwide, that
the international community can bring to fruition this struggle
to reclaim the world from the clutches of terrorism.‖68
In an earlier article,69 Professor Strauss surveyed the
cases in the United States brought under the various acts70
provided by Congress to facilitate suing terrorists and state
sponsors of terrorism.71 Most notable is the terrorist
exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.72 This
67

Id. at 353. See id. at 339-53, for a more complete understanding
of the efforts made by the United Nations in this area. But see Eric
Rosand, The UN-Led Multilateral Institutional Response to Jihadist
Terrorism: Is a Global Counter-Terrorism Body Needed? 11 J. CONFLICT
AND SECURITY L. 399 (2006) for a critical analysis of the work of the
United Nations and an alternative proposal for combating terrorism.
68
Debra M. Strauss, Reaching Out to the International Community:
Civil Lawsuits as the Common Ground in the Battle Against Terrorism,
19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT‘L. L. 307, 355 (2008-2009).
69
Debra M. Strauss, Enlisting the U.S. Courts in a New Front:
Dismantling the International Business Holdings of Terrorist Groups
Through Federal Statutory and Common-Law Suits, 38 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT‘L L. 682 (2005).
70
In addition to common law tort actions available in every state, the
federal statutes allow plaintiffs to seek civil redress. See the Alien Tort
Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948); the Torture Victim Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a)(1)-(2), 106 Stat. 73 (1993), reprinted in 28
U.S.C. § 1350 note (West 1993); the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(7) [amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996]; and the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, 18
U.S.C.§ 2333.
71
Strauss, supra note 69 at 683-725.
72
Traditionally, sovereign immunity was absolute. There are now
several exceptions to the sovereign immunity concept as expressed in the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§1602 et seq.; See also
Portnoy, Aryeh S. et al., ―The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: 2008
Year in Review‖ 16 L. BUS. RAM. 179, 180-83.
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exception parallels the worldwide recognition in human
rights law that a country cannot mistreat its own subjects or
others with impunity. Professor Strauss proposed an
aggregate model of litigation, using simultaneously the
various remedies available to victims.73 She also outlined
the obstacles faced by victims when seeking to execute on
judgments,74 an issue addressed more fully in the 2009
article.
The two articles, taken together, provide a comprehensive
alternative method of holding perpetrators of terrorism
accountable, and, at the same time, compensating victims of
terrorism for losses sustained by the victims themselves, their
families, and others adversely affected. The effectiveness of
the civil damage approach is validated by the lawsuits filed
against terrorist groups, the Ku Klux Klan and Aryan
Nations, by the Southern Poverty Law Center.75 Huge
damage awards successfully disabled the terrorists‘ activities.
Morris Dees, co-founder and chief legal counsel for the
Southern Poverty Law Center, vividly recounted the events
surrounding the first of these verdicts and his satisfaction
upon hearing of the jury award in 1987. He noted, with
words optimistic for this line of cases, ―History would show
that an all-white Southern jury had held the Klan accountable
after all these years.‖76
Illustrating, however, the political and judicial hurdles
faced by 9/11 victims in their attempts to hold terrorist state
supporters accountable, the United States Supreme Court
recently refused to hear an appeal in In re Terrorist Attacks
on September 11, 2001.77 The decision effectively upheld the
73

Strauss, supra note 69 at 739-41.
Id. at 724-38.
75
See id., n.7 at 742, for a discussion of cases filed in Ala., S.C., and
Idaho, in which the Southern Poverty Center was awarded damages
ranging from 6.3 million to 37.8 million dollars.
76
MORRIS DEES WITH STEVE FIFFER, A SEASON FOR JUSTICE: THE
LIFE AND TIMES OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER, at 330 (1992). See Donald v.
United Klans of Am., No. 84-0725-AH (N.D. Ala. Feb. 12, 1987).
77
In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); aff‘d 538 F.3d 71 (2nd Cir. 2008); cert. denied Federal
Ins. Co. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 129 S.Ct. 2859 (2009).
74
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lower court‘s ruling that Saudi Arabia was immune from the
civil suit filed by 6000 plaintiffs- relatives of victims killed in
the attack, injured victims and business and governmental
entities.78 Although state sponsors of terrorism can be sued
directly under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
exception, only Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria are presently on
the list of state sponsors.79 Daniel L. Byman, Senior Foreign
Policy Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy,
criticized the listings of state sponsors as a ―flawed policy‖
and an ―artifact of bad list management,‖ noting that the list
is outdated and does not reflect current reality at any point in
time.80 Despite the fact that victims‘ suits face formidable
challenges, including sovereign immunity,81 Professor
Strauss, after analyzing case precedents in the area,
concluded that this remedial paradigm is a viable option. The
cases show that civil damages are being awarded by the
courts against terrorists and their supporters.82 Global
enforcement of the awards envisioned in the Strauss plan
would accomplish the ―ultimate goal of these lawsuits . . . to
access and drain terrorist funds.‖83
III. MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES
After numerous hearings and rulings in the lower federal
court system, the consolidated cases in Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project (hereinafter, ―HLP et al‖) reached
the Supreme Court last term.84 When the decision was
78

See Supreme Court: 9/11 Victims Can‘t Sue Saudi Arabia,
Princes, N.Y. Post, June 29, 2009, available at
www.nypost.com/f/print/news/national/supreme_court_victims_can_sue_saudi_ovl.
79
See Andrew Selman, A Guide on: The List of State Sponsors of
Terrorism (June 11, 2010), www.kela.org/SPOTGuide.pdf.
80
See Daniel L. Byman, The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship
of Terrorism (May 2008),
www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/05_terrorism_byman.aspx.
81
Strauss supra note 69.
82
Id. at 683 et seq.
83
Strauss supra note 62, at 310.
84
See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2713-16
(2010) for Roberts, C.J. recounting the circuitous procedural history of the
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announced on June 21, 2010, Justice Breyer, to emphasize the
importance of the dissent, read the minority opinion from the
Bench. The Court heard HLP, et al as an applied preenforcement claim for declaratory judgment brought under 18
U.S.C. §2339 B (a)(1), the material-support provisions of the
statute85 A six judge majority opinion written by Chief
Justice Roberts decided the case in favor of the government,86
while a three judge dissent authored by Justice Breyer argued
for remand and non-constitutional review.87
The petitioners‘ constitutional claims and their
involvement with terrorist organizations are similar. The
Humanitarian Law Project88 and its president, Ralph Fertig,89

two cases which were consolidated at the District Court level. During the
pendency of the cases, initially filed in 1998, the statute was amended to
clarify the terms which HLP contends are still unconstitutionally vague.
85
18 U.S.C. § 2339B, enacted in 1996 as the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA); revised in 2001 as part of the
Patriot Act; and revised again in 2004 as part of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). The applicable section reads:
―Whoever knowingly provides material support or
resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts
or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the
death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for a
term of years or for life. To violate this paragraph, a
person must have knowledge that the organization is a
designated terrorist organization . . . , that the
organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity
. . . , or that the organization has engaged or engages in
terrorism.‖
See id. at 2713 n.1.
86
Id. at 2712-31 (Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, J.J.,
joined Roberts‘, C.J., opinion).
87
Id. at 2731-43 (Ginsburg & Sotomayor, J.J., joined Breyer, J.
dissenting).
88
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1208
(1998) (describing the Humanitarian Law Project as a nongovernmental
organization formed in 1985 to ―promote peaceful resolutions of conflict
by using international human rights law and humanitarian law.‖ The
group has consultative status at the United Nations and is active
worldwide.).
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filed its claim when Secretary of State Madeline Albright in
1997 designated90 the organization, the Kurdistan Workers‘
Party (Paritya Karkeran Kurdestan, hereinafter ―PKK‖)91 a
foreign terrorist organization (hereinafter ―DFTO‖).
Simultaneously with the filing of the suit, HLP ceased
communicating with and assisting the PKK,92 while awaiting
89

See generally Adam Liptak, Right to Free Speech Collides With
Fight Against Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/11/us/11law.html?_r=1&ref=usapatriot
act (describing Ralph Fertig as a 79 year old civil rights lawyer, and a
―freedom fighter,‖ who was arrested in 1961 in Selma, Alabama). In a
recent interview by the New York Times, he claims that the current climate
is ―more dangerous than McCarthyism,‖ explaining that communists
during the McCarthy era were ostracized whereas ―[t]oday, the same
person would be thrown in jail.‖ (A version of this article appeared in
print on Feb. 11, 2010, on page A18 of the New York edition.) Advocates
for the victims also drew parallels, ―AEDPA‘s ban on ‗assistance‘ and
‗advice‘ is essentially no different from the McCarthy Era attempt to root
out association with and advocacy for groups unpopular with the
government,‖ explaining that ―although few individuals were ultimately
prosecuted under the McCarthy Era laws, thousands were persecuted.‖
The Smith Act and the Subversive Activities Control Act ―made it a crime
to associate with . . . designated groups or to speak in support of these
groups.‖ Cf. Brief of Amici Curiae Victims of the McCarthy Era in
Support of Humanitarian Law Project, et al., 2-3, Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010) (No. 08-1498), 2009 WL 4074857.
90
8 U.S.C. §§ 1189 (a)(1), (4)(B) (2004) (authorizing the Executive
to identify and designate foreign terrorist organizations, known as
DFTOs. The law provides for any organization, so designated, to contest
the designation); HLP, supra note 88, at 310 (explaining that the PKK did
not contest the designation, but the LTTE did so, unsuccessfully).
91
The PKK was established in 1970 and, since the mid 1980‘s, has
pushed to establish an independent Kurdish state in southeast Turkey. In
1984, the group representing approximately 15% of the Turkish
population launched its struggle against the government of Turkey using
terrorist tactics. See also Gabriel Gatehouse, Seeking Out the PKK
Gunmen in Iraq's Remote Mountains, BBC, July 21, 2010,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10703204 (reporting that
since 1984, more than 40,000 people had been killed. The group has
―used the inaccessible mountains of northern Iraq as a base from which to
plan and execute attacks inside Turkey.‖).
92
See Opening Brief for Humanitarian Law Project, et al., at 10,
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010) (Nos. 081498, 09-89), 2009 WL 3865433, for claim that HLP had been ―assisting
the PKK by training them to bring human rights complaints to the United
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court determination that its communications with the
organization were not criminally proscribed by the materialsupport provisions of §2339 B.93 Nagalingam Jeyalingan,
MD, a Tamil-American, and five nonprofit groups whose
activities support the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(hereinafter ―LTTE‖), filed a separate but similar action.94
As two of the thirty groups listed as DFTOs in 1997, both
the PKK and the LTTE represent liberation movements
seeking to establish autonomous states for minorities. The
PKK are fighting to establish an independent Kurdish state in
the southeastern portion of Turkey, and the LTTE to establish
a homeland for the Tamils in the northeast portion of Sri
Lanka. Within Sri Lanka, the Tamil sympathizers were
aiding persons of Tamil descent in their struggle against the
ruling powers in Sri Lanka.95 The LTTE ostensibly ceased
activities within Sri Lanka when it was defeated in 2009.96
Nations, advocating on their behalf and assisting them in peace
negotiations.‖
93
See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4)
(according to the material-support provisions, ―a person or organization is
prohibited from providing any property, tangible or intangible, or service,
including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities,
financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance,
safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications
equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel . .
. and transportation, except medicine or religious materials‖).
94
For a complete description of the parties and organizations
represented in the case, see Humanitarian Law Project, et al. v. John
Ashcroft, et al., Case No.: CV 03-6107 ABC (MCx), Order re: Plaintiffs‘
Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants Motion to Dismiss, filed
Jan. 22, 2004, United States District Court, Central District of California,
at pages 8-11. Nagalingam Jeyalingan, a physician, was born in Sri Lanka
and is a naturalized citizen. He is described as a ―surgeon with specialized
training in otolaryngology,‖ at 9, available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.
95
See The History of the Tamil Tigers,
http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2008. The LTTE was reported to have
an international network with branches in over 54 countries (last visited
Aug. 15, 2010).
96
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2716-17
(2010). See majority opinion, id. at 2716-17. Sri Lankan President
Mahinda Rajapaska declared victory over the insurgents in May of 2009
ending the 26 year civil war struggle to create an independent Tamil
Eelam state in the northern and eastern part of Sri Lanka. The separatist
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After 2009, the LTTE continues as a ―political organization
outside Sri Lanka advocating for the rights of the Tamils.‖97
The petitioners wished to continue engaging with the PKK
and the LTTE by supporting the lawful, nonviolent political
advocacy activities in which both engage.98
The narrow holding of the opinion was prefigured by the
nature of the relief sought. The fact that the case was heard
under the criminal sanctions of the Patriot Act as a preenforcement, pre-prosecution, as applied action for
declaratory judgment necessitated a narrow holding.99
Accordingly, Roberts applied the material-support provisions
to the ―particular speech‖ plaintiffs proposed to undertake:
(1) train[ing] members of [the] PKK on how to
use humanitarian and international law to
peacefully resolves disputes, (2) teach[ing]
PKK members how to petition various
representative bodies such as the United
Nations for relief, (3) engag[ing] in political
advocacy on behalf of Kurds who live in
Turkey, and (4) engag[ing] in political

group LTTE was organized in 1976 and launched its first major attack in
1983, enjoyed varying degrees of success, using guerrilla war and terrorist
tactics until the 2009 defeat. See Sengupta, Somini and Seth Mydans,
Rebels Routed in Sri Lanka after 25 Years of War, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
2009, available at http://nytimes.com/2009/05/08/world/asia. See also
Anderson, Jon, Lee, Death of the Tiger: Sri Lanka‘s brutal military
victory over the Tamil insurgents, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 17, 2011,
available at www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011.
97
Holder, 130 S.Ct. at 2716.
98
Id. (discussing that prior to the LTTE‘s defeat, they had trained
the group to seek tsunami aid from international bodies and to help them
negotiate peace agreements with the Sri Lankan government, these
activities ceased when the group was defeated).
99
See id. at 2731 (The majority opinion states ―We hold that, in
regulating the particular forms of support that plaintiffs seek to provide to
foreign terrorist organizations, Congress has pursued that objective
consistent with the limitations of the First and Fifth Amendments.‖).
.
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advocacy on behalf of the Tamils who live in
Sri Lanka. 100
The petitioners, human rights advocates, contend that
their free speech and association rights are infringed if they
cannot continue working with the DFTOs. They emphasized
that the two groups represent victims of human rights abuses,
―the Kurds in Turkey, an ethnic minority subjected to
substantial discrimination and human rights violations‖ and
the ―Tamils in Sri Lanka, ―another ethnic minority that has
been subjected to human rights abuse and discrimination.‖101
The human rights advocates insisted that their engagement
with the DFTOs involved a ―broad range of lawful activities‖
unconnected with terrorist activity.
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on February 23,
2010 and delineated the reasoning that would eventually
resonate in the majority and minority opinions. Justice
Roberts clarified the two constitutional challenges by HLP, et
al to § 2339B of the statute.102 By criminalizing their
material support activities to the PKK and LTTE, the statute
violated free speech and association rights guaranteed under
the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court must also
determine whether the terms - training, personnel service and
expert advice or assistance - defined as proscribed material
support in §2339(b)(1) were unconstitutionally vague.103
HLP, et al argued that the statute was vaguely drafted and
deprived them and other similar groups of due process under
the Fifth Amendment as well as infringing their rights of free
expression and association under the First Amendment. The
governments argued that the terms, which has been amended
and explained by Congress, were not vague but gave
adequate notice of what constituted punishable conduct under
the statute. Persons are clearly prohibited from engaging in
100

See id. at 2729 (excluding the two that had become moot during
the pendency of the litigation: teaching Tamils to apply for ―tsunamirelated relief‖ and helping LTTE to negotiate a peace settlement).
101
Supra note 92 at 12.
102
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2714
(2010).
103
Id.
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conduct which would benefit the terrorist in terrorist
activities.
The government supported its argument with legislative
history. Congress had found that material support would
include any support, humanitarian, political or financial,
which would free up other resources that terrorists could then
use for unlawful purposes. Congress specifically recognized
that Foreign Terrorist Organizations, those designated by the
government as DFTOs, ―are so tainted by their criminal
conduct that any contribution to . . . [the] organization
facilitates that [criminal] conduct.‖104
Solicitor General Elana Kagan stressed the importance of
these findings at oral argument telling Justice Breyer,
―Congress is the reasonable person here. And Congress
reasonably decided that when you help a terrorist - foreign
terrorist organization‘s legal activities, you are also helping
the foreign terrorist organization‘s illegal activities.‖105 She
further insisted, ―Congress made findings about the
fungibility of these resources. Congress said over and over
that these organizations [DFTOs] have no firewalls, no
organizational firewalls, no financial firewalls.‖106 When
Justice Ginsburg insisted that the humanitarian groups only
wanted to ―train [the PKK and LTTE] how to do lawful
things, how to pursue their goals in a lawful, rather than
terrorist way,‖107 Kagan responded that Congress had
specifically prohibited ―the provision of actual support:
Services to the organizations that the organization can use in
its activities, both legal and illegal.‖108 The same argument
was made in an amici brief filed by persons involved in
fighting terrorism who noted that ―Congress had fashioned [a
comprehensive scheme] over a period of years to address the
complex problem of transnational terrorism‖109 realizing that
104

AEDPA Pub. L. No. 104-132 § 301 (a) 7, 110 Stat. 1214, 1247.
Oral Argument, at 39, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130
S.Ct. 2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2010 WL 621318.
106
Id. at 42:5-8.
107
Id. at 45:10-11.
108
Oral Argument, 45:24-25, 46:1-2.
109
Brief of Amicus Curiae Scholars, Attorneys, and Former Public
Officials with Experience in Terrorism-Related Issues in Support of
105
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DFTOs use ―putatively nonviolent programs to enhance
incentives for terrorist activity.‖110 Counsel David D. Cole
representing HLP, however, responding to Justice
Sotomayor‘s question about money being fungible for
terrorist groups,111 noted that HLP, et al‘s goals had ―nothing
to do with money.‖112
Justice Roberts relied heavily on the fungibility
arguments espoused by the government and amici and the
fact that Congress had made specific findings about the
fungibility of various kinds of aid given to the legal and
legitimate activities of the terrorist organization. He very
meticulously rejected plaintiff‘s argument that, because the
projected support to PKK and LTTE would only further the
peaceful goals of the two organizations, HLP, et al activities
should not be restricted.
The Court looked to both
Congressional findings113 and Executive conclusions114 to
support its position on the fungibility of material support.
Congress found that ―foreign organizations that engage in
terrorist activity are so tainted by the criminal conduct that
any contribution to such an organization facilitates that
conduct.‖115 Roberts also noted that the State Department
strongly supported the congressional finding that ―all
contributions to foreign terrorist organizations further their
terrorism.‖116 In the Executive‘s view, ―Given the purposes,
organizational structure, and clandestine nature of foreign
terrorist organizations, it is highly likely that any material
support . . . will ultimately enure to the benefit of their

Petitioners, at p. 8, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705
(2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2009 WL 5070069.
110
Id. at *12.
111
Oral Argument, 61:16-20, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2010 WL 621318.
112
Id. at 62:10-11.
113
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2726
(2010).
114
Id. at 2727.
115
Id. at 2724 (quoting from AEDPA §§ 301 (a)(1)-(7), 110 Stat.
1247, note following 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Findings and Purpose)
(emphasis added by the Court)).
116
Id. at 2727.
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criminal, terrorist functions - regardless of . . . [intent] to
support non-violent non-terrorist activities.‖117
The majority noted that the national security interest in
the case included ―national defense, foreign relations, or
economic interests of the United States.‖118 Stressing the
foreign relations component, the majority found that material
support ―in any form also furthers terrorism by straining
United States‘ relationships with its allies and undermining
cooperative efforts between nations to prevent terrorist
attacks.‖119 The majority recognized that both the PKK and
LTTE are insurgency groups at war with internationally
recognized nations with whom the United States must deal as
independent sovereigns in a global effort to combat terrorism.
Chief Justice Roberts specifically mentioned Turkey, a
NATO ally, as a nation with whom relations might be
compromised when material support to its declared enemy is
given by Americans and related non-profit organizations.120
The majority also accepted the government‘s argument
that HLP, et al‘s projected activities would lend legitimacy to
the DFTOs121 and undermine United States‘ efforts to
delegitimize and weaken terrorist groups. Justice Breyer,
dissenting, rejected the legitimacy rationale as ultimately
detrimental to First Amendment protections.122
He
characterized the arguments as antithetical to the First
Amendment support of the deliberative process, fearing that
the concept ―would deny First Amendment protection to the
peaceful teaching of international human rights law on the
117

Id. at 2727 (quoting McKune Affidavit, App. 133 ¶ 8).
Id. at 2713 (as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (d)(2) as legislation
giving the Secretary of State authority to designate Foreign Terrorist
Organizations).
119
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2726
(2010).
120
Id.
121
Id. at 2725-26. The group would be contributing material support
that would ―help lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups-legitimacy
that makes it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to
raise funds-all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks.‖ See also Brief
for the Respondents at 56, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct.
2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2009 WL 4951303.
122
Id. at 2736.
118
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ground that a little knowledge about ‗the international legal
system‘ is too dangerous a thing.‖123
The government argued that, because the statute only
regulated conduct, the ―vast majority of its applications do
not even . . . implicate the First Amendment.‖124 The
Solicitor General explained that the material-support statute
does not prohibit independent advocacy and insisted that the
association clause does not give American citizens the right
to ―deal in whatever way they wish with foreign nations . . .
or foreign organizations.‖125
Counsel David Cole forcefully asserted his clients‘ rights
to give peacetime assistance to further peaceful goals, an
activity protected by the Constitution. He distinguished HLP,
et al.‘s proposed activities from acts of treason which are
punishable as a crime under the Constitution. He argued that
treason, which involved giving aid to the enemy, ―c[ould] be
in the form of speech‖ but that prosecution for treason
required proof of specific intent to betray the United States.126
His clients, to be guilty of a crime, would necessarily have to
have the mens rea associated with the crime, i.e. the intent to
further terrorist activity. Cole insisted that the PKK and
LTTE are separatist groups with whom the United States is
not at war, and that his clients‘ speech-related activity had
nothing to do with terrorism.
Chief Justice Roberts, for the majority, rejected the
proposition that a specific intent requirement should be read
into the statute for culpability to attach. He noted, ―We reject
plaintiff‘s interpretation of §2339(B) because it is
inconsistent with the text of the statute.‖127 The statute
specifically prohibits ―knowingly providing material support.
. .a person [to violate the statute] must have knowledge that
the organization is a designated terrorist organization . . . has
123

Id. at 2738.
Reply Brief for Petitioners at 11, Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2009 WL 2599311.
125
Oral Argument at 34, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130
S.Ct. 2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2010 WL 621318.
126
Id. at 23-24.
127
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2717
(2010).
124
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engaged or engages in terrorist activity . . . Congress . . .
chose knowledge about the organization‘s connection to
terrorism, not specific intent to further the organization‘s
terrorist activities.‖128
Justice Breyer, writing for Justices Sotomayor and
Ginsburg, accepted HLP, et al‘s invitation to avoid deciding
the First Amendment issue by reading the knowledge
requirement as specific intent to further the terrorist aims of
the organization. Such a reading necessitated remanding the
case for proof of such intent.
I believe that a construction that would avoid
the constitutional problem is ‗fairly
possible.‘… I would read the statute as
criminalizing First-Amendment-protected pure
speech and association only when the
defendant knows or intends that those
activities will assist the organization‘s
unlawful terrorist actions.129
Accordingly, Breyer set up a four part test.
The defendant would have to know or intend:
(1) that he is providing support or resources,
(2) that he is providing that support to a
foreign terrorist organization, and (3) that he
is providing support that is material, meaning
(4) that his support bears a significant
likelihood of furthering the organization‘s
terrorist ends.130
Breyer reasoned that such an interpretation is ―consistent
with the statutes text . . . [and] with Congress‘ basic intent . .
.‖131 Breyer‘s textual analysis differs markedly from the
analysis by Chief Justice Roberts who relied on the precise
words used by Congress in context with the degree of
128
129
130
131

Id.
Id. at 2740.
Id. at 2740-41.
Id. at 2742.

142

Trends and Issues in Terrorism and the Law

Vol.5

knowledge required in other sections of the Act, as well as
the legislative intent expressed by Congress when passing the
provision. Breyer, to find the specific intent requirement,
relied primarily on Congress‘ expressed intent that the statute
was not to interfere with First Amendment free speech and
association.
Breyer also discredits the fungibility argument and the
legislative history supporting it. He finds the evidence as too
general and non-specific to be credited.
The most that one can say in the government‘s
favor is that [the legislative history] might be
read as offering highly general support for the
argument. The statements do not, however,
explain in any detail how the plaintiff‘s
political-advocacy-related activities might
actually be ‗fungible‘ and therefore capable of
being
directed
to
terrorist
use.132
The majority interprets the communication urged by HLP,
et al not as speech, but as conduct which uses speech. Chief
Justice Roberts points out that direct advocacy which would
implicate First Amendment concerns is not proscribed by the
statute. Humanitarian organizations can freely speak - but
cannot give ―material support‖ to DFTOs.133
Justice Breyer, however, regarded the communication and
association urged by HLP, et al as pure political speech
entitled to the highest constitutional protection. Attorney
Cole, at oral argument during rebuttal, pointed out that ―[t]he
government has spent a decade arguing that our clients
cannot advocate for peace, cannot inform about international
human rights.‖134 This theme would dominate Justice
Breyer‘s dissent. After listing the protected speech and
activities proposed by HLP, et al, he characterized them as
the ―kind that the First Amendment ordinarily protects.‖135
132
133
134
135

Id. at 2735.
Id. at 2723-24.
Oral Argument 59:12-14.
Supra note 133 at 2732.
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He insisted that the court should remand the case and require
the government to present ―specific evidence, rather than
general assertion‖ to prove that the statute requirements are
the least restrictive means possible to accomplish the
compelling government national security purpose.136
Both opinions appropriate prudential doctrines of judicial
restraint. The majority decides narrowly as an applied preprosecution request for declaratory judgment by relying
heavily on the presumption that the legislative act is
constitutional; by noting that the act was regularly passed and
meticulously amended to provide clarity; by refusing to read
beyond the text and legislative history; by applying plain
meaning to the words used; by refusing to disregard the plain
meaning of the words to find what Justice Breyer terms
―actual intent.‖ The minority appropriates the prudential
maxim of not deciding the constitutional issue if is ‟fairly
possible‖ to resolve the dispute another way, i.e. the canon of
constitutional avoidance urged by HLP, et al. This the
minority does by interpretation, construing the statute to
require ―specific intent to further the [DFTO‘s] unlawful
ends‖ coupled with a likelihood that the harm would result.137
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer both agreed that
the material-support requirements were not unconstitutionally
vague. The application of the requirements marked the point
of disagreement. The majority reviewed the proposed
activities of HLP, et al and found that the organization would
be punished for contravening the act, accepting essentially
the government‘s arguments. The minority required more
proof that the activities were proscribed by the act, effectively
accepting HLP, et al‘s arguments, and remanding for

136

Id. at 2742.
Id. at 2740. See also Brief for Academic Researchers and the
Citizens Media Law Project as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents/Cross-Petitioners at 25, Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2009 WL 4271309.
They argued for free speech and transparency, reasoning the ―[t]he
requirement of specific intent is particularly important where individuals
seek to associate in some manner with groups (like those at issue in this
case . . .) that engage in both lawful and unlawful activity.‖
137
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evidence of specific intent to further the terrorists‘ unlawful
activity.
Although the government argued for application of the
O‘Brien intermediate standard of review,138 the majority
rejected that standard and applied strict scrutiny. The
minority agreed that the stricter standard of review was
necessary. The Court specifically rejected the O‘Brien
standard of review, but both cases present strikingly similar
scenarios. In O‘Brien, the government‘s interest in national
security prompted the government‘s comprehensive selective
service program with the requirement that draft cards remain
intact. O‘Brien, to protest the Viet Nam War, destroyed his
draft card. The O‘Brien court construed the activity, not as
political speech, but as an act which would thwart or disrupt
the operation of the selective service program, and thereby
negatively impact national security. O‘Brien‘s conviction
was upheld. In HLP, et al, the government‘s interest in
national security prompted the government comprehensive
provisions to identify foreign terrorist organizations through
the DFTO program and to prevent third parties from giving
the organizations material support. HLP, et al, to further
their humanitarian outreach to political insurgents, would
counsel DFTOs in nonviolent methods to achieve their
political ends. The majority characterized HLP, et al‘s
activities not as political or ―pure‖ speech but as activities
that were specifically proscribed by the Patriot Act‘s material
support provisions.
Urging the Court to adopt the lower O‘Brien standard of
review, the government had argued that ―the statute at issue
here regulates conduct, divorced from any relation to the
content of expression.‖139 The majority, however, rejected
the proposition that the statute regulated conduct without any
relation to speech. Chief Justice Roberts distinguished the
138

See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 9, Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2009 WL 2599311,
for the government argument that because the statute ―regulates conduct
and only incidentally restricts speech . . . the statute is subject to
intermediate scrutiny under United States v. O‘Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968).‖
139
Id. at 11.
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cases and found that the heightened level of scrutiny was
necessary in HLP, et al, because speech was intricately
involved in HLP, et al‘s projected activities, and i.e. the
humanitarian organizations intended to use speech to
accomplish humanitarian goals. In O‘Brien, the regulation
was content neutral, draft cards were not to be destroyed for
any reason. Recognizing that the O‘Brien test applied only to
content neutral regulations,140 the majority noted that §2339B
―regulates speech on the basis of its content,‖ the ―[p]laintiffs
want to speak to the PKK and the LTTE, and whether they
may do so under §2339B depends on what they say.‖141 Both
the majority and the minority opinions rejected the O‘Brien
test. Justice Breyer reasoned that the stricter standard of
review was necessary because he characterized HLP, et al‘s
projected activities as political or ―pure‖ speech which is
always protected under a properly applied strict scrutiny
standard.
The majority and the dissent agree on the level of scrutiny
required to review the material support provisions of the
Patriot Act and on some other issues: the justiciability of
H.L.P. et al‘s pre-enforcement claim,142 the fact that the
government has a compelling national security interest, and
the fact that the four types of support proscribed by the Act
are not unconstitutionally vague, but enforceable.143
140

See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. at 2723 (quoting Chief
Justice Roberts, that the intermediate scrutiny test provides that ―content
neutral regulation will be sustained under the First Amendment if it
advances important government interests unrelated to the suppression of
free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary
to further those goals.‖).
141
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2723
(2010).
142
Id. at 2717. The Court found the case was justiciable because the
plaintiffs faced ―‗a credible threat of prosecution‘ and ‗should not be
required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of
seeking relief.‘‖ Quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298
(1979) and Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128-129
(2007).
143
Id. at 2719-20 n.6 (applying the test for vagueness as stated in
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008), ―. . .whether the
statute ‗provide[s] a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is
prohibited.‘‖). See id. at 2731, for Justice Breyer's dissent, ―Like the
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However, the opinions differ substantially in framing the
issue before them. The majority defines the issue as whether
the government may prohibit what Plaintiffs want to do provide material support to the PKK and LTTE in the form of
speech.144 The dissent frames the issue as whether the
government has ―met its burden of showing that an
interpretation of the statute that would prohibit this speechand association- related activity serves the Government‘s
compelling interest in combating terrorism.‖145 Or, as
restated, whether the Government has proved under the strict
scrutiny standard of review that the specific speech and
associated-related activity proposed by H.L.P. et al falls
within the scope of material support proscribed by §2339B.
Highlighting the current tone of incivility in Supreme
Court opinions, both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer
disparage the other‘s opinion.
Chief Justice Roberts
dismisses the dissent‘s analysis of the prohibited speech as
limited and unfounded,146 faults the dissent for ignoring
common sense and the evidence presented by the
government,147 for adopting the mental state requirement by
ignoring Congress‘ express rejection of the requirement,148
for requiring hard evidence of intent from the Government, a
―dangerous requirement,‖149 for giving insufficient weight to
the Executive and Congressional findings and substituting its
―own evaluation of the evidence for a reasonable evaluation
by the Legislative Branch,‖150 for failing to address the ―real
dangers at stake‖ by living in a different ―dissent‘s world‖
Court, and substantially for the reasons it gives, I do not think the statute
is unconstitutionally vague.‖
144
See id. at 2724 n.10.
145
Id. at 2731.
146
See id. at 2723 n.4.
147
See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2726
n.6 (2010).
148
See id. at 2718 n.3.
149
Id. at 2727-28.
150
Id. at 2727. C.J. Roberts, quoting from Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57, 68 (1981), emphasizing also the fact that Congress‘ ability to
collect evidence and draw factual inferences is superior to the Court‘s -―‗. . .the lack of competence on the part of the court is marked.‘‖ Id. at
65.
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heedless of the congressional and executive conclusion that
―we live in a different world.‖151 Justice Breyer faults the
majority for its ―development of the Government themes‖ on
mere speculation,152 for stretching the concept of fungibility
beyond constitutional limits,153 for ―assuming‖ without hard
evidence that ―those who are taught will put otherwise
innocent speech or knowledge to bad use . . .,‖154 for adopting
a rule which ―would automatically forbid the teaching of any
subject in a case where national security interests conflict
with the First Amendment,‖155 for misunderstanding the word
―relief‖ by not restricting it to mean only monetary relief and
for ignoring plaintiff counsel‘s denial at oral argument that
HLP, et al do not intend to offer monetary relief to the
DFTOs,156 for reading too broadly Congress‘ ―informed
judgment‖ to included the proposed activity,157 for not
requiring specific proof of fungibility but relying on
generalities and speculation,158 for ―sacrific[ing] First
Amendment protection for… speculative gain,‖159 for being
―wrong about the lack of specificity‖ of the plaintiff‘s
advocacy claims,160 for not remanding for factual
determination under a ―proper standard of review,‖161 for
failing to ―examine the Government‘s justifications with
sufficient care,‖162 for failing to require specific evidence and
―tailoring of means to fit compelling ends.‖163

151
152
153

Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. at 2729.
Id. at 2737 et seq.
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2738

(2010).
154

Id. at 2738.
Id.
156
Id. at 2738-2739.
157
Id. at 2739.
158
Id. at 2735.
159
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2739
(2010) (quoting from Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic
National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 127 (1973)).
160
Id. at 2743.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
155
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How do the opinions expressed in HLP, et al contribute to
the search for a remedial paradigm? Both sides of the
argument were fully presented and the discussion enriched.
Although reasonable judicial minds differed on the effect and
the scope of the government regulation, the immediate result
is that the Congressional material-support statute is not
unconstitutionally vague and no specific intent to further the
unlawful ends of the terrorist organization is required to
prove a violation. The specific activity proposed by HLP, et
al is proscribed by §2339B. Although application of the
material-support prohibitions to the plaintiffs‘ proposed
activities survived strict scrutiny under the First Amendment,
future applications may not pass constitutional muster as the
majority warned.164
Independent speech, speech not
coordinated with a DFTO, remains untouched by the opinion,
which indicates that future as applied challenges to the statute
will continue. Chief Justice Roberts stressed that the narrow
holding did not reach domestic terrorist groups and found
only that ―in prohibiting the particular forms of support that
plaintiffs seek to provide to foreign terrorist groups, §2339
does not violate the freedom of speech.‖165
The ultimate significance of the ruling awaits future
assessment, but the continuing dialogue between the
governmental branches is expected to accelerate. Free speech
advocates claim that the case is another example of
overreaction during a time of crisis. Initial response to the
holding was predictable.
Those who think that the
Constitution speaks with one voice during times of crisis as
well as in times of peace find the opinion unsettling.166 The
reaction of Kay Guinane and Suraj K. Sazawai is
representative.167
Calling the decision a ―stunningly
164
165

Id. at 2730.
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2730

(2010).
166

See Supreme Court‘s Humanitarian Law Project Ruling Fails the
Common Sense Test, June 29, 2010, available at
www.charityandsecurity.org.
167
Id. (Writing for the Charities and Society Network which Kay
Guinane and other non-profit interest groups established in 2008 to
respond to counter-terrorism activity perceived to impede unnecessarily
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nonsensical result‖ which showed an ―extraordinary level of
deference to Congress and the administration in matters of
national security,‖ the authors noted that Congress and the
President must now take responsibility to ―review current
policies and make some changes‖ and predicted that
Congress ―will find that in most instances, allowing U.S.
conflict mediators, peacebuilders and humanitarian aid
workers to do their work weakens terrorist groups.‖168
Similarly, a group represented by David Cole,169 which
earlier called for reforms to the material support law, will
presumably continue to work for reform.170
Obviously,
those who adhere to Cicero‘s adage inter arma silent leges,
and those who stress the immediate need to protect national
security find the result laudable.171
and detrimentally the work of charitable organizations. The group, a
project of OMB Watch, is headquartered at 1400 16th St. NW, Suite 210,
in Washington, D.C.).
168
Id.
169
David Cole, Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law
Center, and David Keene, Chairman, American Conservative Union, cochaired the Constitution Project‘s Liberty and Security Committee which
recommended reforms on Nov. 17, 2009. See Reforming the Material
Support Laws: Constitutional Concerns Presented by Prohibitions on
Material Support to ―Terrorist Organizations,‖ available at
www.constitutionproject.org. The Committee made eight
recommendations for reform. The first recommendation calling for
amending the definition of material support to require intent to further
illegal conduct is even more important given that the argument to the
judiciary failed in HLP, et al. The report also calls for Congress to
amend the categories of support to exempt additional examples of
humanitarian aid, info@constitutionproject.org.
170
David Cole analyzed the Supreme Court decision, noting that the
Supreme Court ruled, for ―the first time in its history that speech
advocating only lawful non-violent activity can be subject to criminal
penalty,‖ and concluded that the Court ―appear[s] to be repeating history
rather than learning from it.‖ David Cole, the Roberts Court vs. Free
Speech: Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, a case decided by the
Supreme Court, June 24, 2010, THE N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Aug. 19,
2010.
171
See generally, Paul Rosenzweig, Yes, Virginia, Supporting
Terrorists IS a Crime (June 21, 2010), Protect America, Rule of Law, at
blog.heritage.org/2010/06/21/yes-virginia-supporting-terrorists-is-acrime.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Each of these three areas of litigation exemplifies an
unending search to find the remedial paradigm that will
effectively combat and prevent terrorism. The paradigms are
neither comprehensive nor mutually exclusive.
The
solutions, and others that have been offered, reflect different
approaches to solving terrorism issues. Academics are
divided over whether the remedial paradigm should be part of
a war strategy172 or a criminal strategy173 or a combination of
the two.174
Others have found both strategies to be
inadequate or deficient and have offered different
solutions.175 The necessity to combat terrorism continues as
does the effort to find a remedial paradigm.
172

See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 2047 (2005) (for authors‘ contention that the war on terrorism is a
―real war.‖ Although ―there are indeed differences between this conflict
and more traditional interstate conflicts . . .,‖ the authors conclude that
―Congress has authorized the President to fully prosecute a war against
the entities covered by the [Authorization for Use of Military Force]).‖
173
See Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status After 9/11: Attacks
on the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT‘L L. 325, 326-27 (2003) Paust argues
that the ―United States simply cannot be at war with bin Laden and al
Queda as such . . . .‖ The laws of war should be left intact and not
changed to encompass a ―war on terror,‖ but other ―international laws
involving criminal responsibility and universal jurisdiction, including
crimes against humanity . . .‖ do apply to acts of terror.
174
See Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL‘Y 457, 479, 485 (2002) Professor Feldman suggests that
the ―war/crime distinction‖ may ―break down‖ in the case of international
terrorism . . .‖ and that a pragmatic, flexible approach which blurs the
distinction may be appropriate to protect ―republicanism.
175
Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L. J.
1029 (2004). Professor Ackerman, after concluding that neither the law
of war nor the law of crime can deal with acts of terrorism, has
―design[ed] a constitutional framework for a temporary state of
emergency.‖ Id. at 1037; see generally 1032-37. His model includes a
limited role for the judiciary, as the solution ―simply cannot afford the
time needed for serious judicial review.‖ Id. at 1066. He calls not for a
constitutional amendment, but a legislative framework statute which
would deal with terrorism on a state of emergency basis, using the
techniques that ―impose constitutional order on new and unruly realities
that were unforeseen by the Founders.‖ Id. at 1077.

